This event study uses economic forecasts and opinion polls to measure the response of expectations to election surprise. Use of forecast data complements older work on partisan cycles by allowing a tighter link between election and response thereby mitigating concerns of endogeneity and omitted variables. I find that forecasters respond swiftly and significantly to election surprise. I further argue that the response ought to vary across countries with different institutional foundations. In support, I find that there exist three distinct patterns in forecasters' responses to partisan surprise corresponding to Hall and Soskice's three varieties of capitalism.
Introduction

An example of politically induced macroeconomic volatility
The National Election Study conducted over the two months prior to the US Presidential election of November 7th, 2000 showed Democratic candidate Al Gore with a nine point lead over Republican candidate George W. Bush among intended voters. However, Election Day proved that the contest was essentially a dead heat and, due to ballot recounts in Florida, did not produce a victor. a virtual tie rather than the expected Gore victory, the average forecast of 2001 calendar year GDP growth dropped one half of one percentage point. Upon resolution of the standoff in Bush's favor by the Supreme Court, the average of GDP growth forecasts dropped another half-point. Expected bond yields also plunged, witnessing a one-time drop of six tenths of a point in the month following the Supreme Court ruling (see Fig. 1 ). This episode points to an intriguing connection between the information revealed during elections and forecasts of the subsequent performance of the economy.
In this paper, I examine the response of economic forecasts to changes in expected political leadership in industrialized countries. There are three main results. First, I find that forecasts respond strongly to partisan surprise, indicating that forecasters do perceive important differences between the macroeconomic policies of the left and right and expect those differences to translate into different macroeconomic outcomes. I also proceed to demonstrate that these forecasters are capable of processing political information reasonably accurately. Forecasts are ideal for measuring these partisan effects because they are jump variables and can respond to information much more quickly than macroeconomic state variables, allowing for a much tighter link between cause and effect. Use of forecast data complements older work on politically-induced macroeconomic volatility which measured responses in macroeconomic variables several years after the election and thus raised questions of endogeneity, omitted variables, and the power of the tests.
Second, I argue that the response of forecasts to election surprise ought to depend on the institutional organization of the economy in question. This is because (a) the political cleavage over economic policy is a function of the underlying organization of the economy in question and (b) the ability of a government to enact its platform is a function of the institutions of governance which are at least correlated and likely co-evolved with the economic institutions. As a result, the economic effects of political surprise should vary considerably across countries. I find strong evidence that this is the case. The perceived difference between the policies of the left and right in liberal market economies is very different than the difference between left and right in coordinated market economies which are again different from the perceived difference in Mediterranean market economies. The novel implication is that liberal market economies, coordinated market economies, and Mediterranean economies ought to experience rather different partisan political business cycles.
Finally, I argue that, in its effects on macroeconomic variables, policy is more than simply a choice of the degree of aggregate demand stimulus. In industrialized democracies, elected officials control fiscal and regulatory directly as well as possibly influencing monetary policy indirectly. Fiscal and regulatory policy are often multi-dimensional. As a result, political effects should be more complex than simple oscillation along an unemployment-inflation tradeoff. The results support this notion of a multi-dimensional policy-space. Forecasters clearly believe the difference between parties' policies to be more complex than a simple choice of position on a short-run Phillips curve. In some countries, the perceived difference between parties is a classic tradeoff between output/unemployment and inflation. But in other countries, one party is expected to increase output without any effect on unemployment or inflation. And in a third group of countries, one party is expected simultaneously to increase output, decrease unemployment, and decrease inflation compared to its (economically less competent) political opposition.
In the course of the study, I introduce two data sets: a commercially available data set on expectations which is new to this literature and a set of pre-electoral opinion polls which I have assembled for this study in order to quantify the change in expected political leadership resulting from an election.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the theory and basic data on partisan political business cycles and argues that we ought to expect heterogeneous
